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What do we expect from an ombudsman?




This paper looks at expectations people have of informal justice mechanisms through a rich empirical 
dataset of 2775 recent ombudsman users in Germany and the United Kingdom. In a cross-cultural 
comparison the ombudsman, as a model of justice is explored. Not much is known about people’s 
expectations towards the ombudsman model; this paper starts to fill the gap. Four roles became apparent 
as cross-cultural narratives in the dataset; people who interact with ombudsmen expect them to be 
interpreters, advocates, allies and instruments. The identified roles are largely common to both 
countries, but in some aspects they show national specificities. These national specificities are seen 
mainly in the use of language; in Germany it is more legalistic in comparison to the UK. I argue that this 
might be related to what has been described as the general legal culture of each country and the 
institutional set-up.
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores people’s expectations of an ombudsman1 in a cross-cultural comparison. Questions 
guiding this exploration are: What does the public expect from an ombudsman? What informs these 
expectations, and do they vary according to the type of ombudsman or by country? 
This paper takes individuals’ attitudes towards an ombudsman as a starting point, and explores 
narratives of similarities and differences. It is based on a rich dataset, consisting of 2,775 responses to 
surveys, collected over six months (September 2015 – March 2015) from recent users’ of ombudsman 
services in Germany and the United Kingdom. Four roles are identified in peoples’ general attitudes 
towards this system of everyday justice.
An ombudsman offers a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) that provides consumers 
with a pathway to resolve their complaints about goods and services (private sector ombudsmen); and 
provides citizens with a means to resolve their complaints about public service providers (public sector 
ombudsmen). The ombudsmen are positioned outside the formal legal system, but are part of the realm 
of administrative and civil justice (Adler 2012: 31, Creutzfeldt 2014: 528). Over recent decades 
ombudsmen have grown into being a substantial and permanent feature relating to the legal systems in 
∗
 ESRC Research Fellow, Lecturer in Law, University of Westminster, Research Fellow of Wolfson College, University of 
Oxford. This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) [grant number ES/K00820X/1]. I 
am very grateful to Petra Mahy, Agniezka Kubal, Christina Cook, Kirsten McConnachie, and Fernanda Pirie for helpful 
feedback in the process of writing this paper. I also want to thank the reviewers for insightful suggestions to improve the 
paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the SLSA annual conference in Warwick 31 March- 2 April 2015.
1
 The term ombudsman is used not to imply gender; rather it is how these bodies call themselves in Germany and the UK.
 2
many countries around the world. Originally a part of constitutional accountability systems (Seneviratne 
2002), ombudsmen are now also firmly part of the private civil justice realm (Hodges, Benöhr, and 
Creutzfeldt-Banda 2012), performing an important independent complaints-handling function. This 
positions the ombudsman as a significant alternative dispute resolution pathway, outside the courts. 
The rapid expansion of the ombudsman enterprise (Buck, Kirkham, and Thompson 2011) across 
the public and private sectors (what Harlow and Rawlings (2009) have termed ombudsmania) has 
brought with it a growing variety of institutional and jurisdictional arrangements, operational styles, and 
decision-making processes. It offers distinct possibilities for the study of the relationship between 
decision-making practices on the part of ombudsmen and perceptions of justice on the part of users 
across different jurisdictions and cultures. 
The paper is divided into six parts. An introduction to the ombudsman in public and private 
settings; followed by part two, an outline of the informal justice system as understood in this paper; the 
methodology as part three; then part four presents the data of recent users of ombudsmen; part five 
compares people’s expectations of the informal justice system; and part six concludes the paper. 
II. OMBUDSMEN AS AN INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The informal justice systems, as discussed in this paper, include processes of justice that are distinct 
from the formal legal system, as implemented through the courts. Practises of ADR take place alongside 
the national court system in most countries. I choose to keep these loose categories of formal and 
informal, distinguishing ADR from courts, to be able to think about justice broadly (Sternlight 2002: 
304). The ombudsman is an institution of informal justice systems. Whereas the formal processes of 
justice have been explored extensively, gaps remain in understanding of models of informal justice 
systems in Europe, especially ombudsmen (Hodges et al 2012).
Public sector ombudsmen are part of the constitutional and administrative justice landscape in 
many countries across the world. The model originated in Sweden in 1809. In the UK the parliamentary 
ombudsman was established as a ‘system of justice…modelled not on the domestic common law courts 
but on the inquisitorial approach adopted from further afield. The chief characteristics of this institution 
were to be impartial and informal’ (Abraham, 2011). An ombudsman is not bound by the formalities of 
the court system and the procedures are more flexible. They are based on an inquisitorial rather than an 
adversarial method of fact-finding and the results lead to recommendations rather than binding 
judgments.
Private sector ombudsmen developed much later than their established relatives in the public 
sector (Creutzfeldt 2013). They were created because of the need for access to justice for small-value 
consumer complaints about goods and services. Different countries have different models of 
ombudsmen (Hodges et al 2012). Recent EU-wide legislation on consumer ADR (Directive 
2013/11/EU) requires standardization of the availability and the quality of ADR bodies (such as 
ombudsmen). The directive was to be implemented in July 2015 (Hodges and Creutzfeldt 2013). There 
are some consumer sectors that are subject to EU-wide regulation with mandatory ADR coverage, for 
example financial services, energy, and telecommunications. This paper focuses on established 
ombudsmen models in Germany and the UK. Similar to the public sector ombudsmen, the private sector 
ombudsmen reach decisions according to what is deemed fair and reasonable (over and above strictly 
legal questions). This approach offers great flexibility with provision of individual justice, which a 
formal legal process might not be able to match (Kirkham 2016). Generally speaking, their processes are 
different from that of a court in that neither public nor private sector ombudsmen can issue legally 
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enforceable decisions (often referred to as ‘lack of teeth’).2 They do not test evidence in adversarial 
settings and do not conform to judicial expectations.  In these ways, the ombudsman process is distinct 
from the formal justice system. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
This paper is based on a dataset that I collected in fourteen different ombudsman schemes in three 
different European countries (UK, France, and Germany). For the purpose of this paper, the UK and 
Germany have been chosen as case studies because the French responses did not provide enough 
material to compare with the other two countries. The UK and German dataset consists of 2,775 
responses to customer satisfaction surveys. The sample of ombudsmen schemes was a combination of 
public and private sector in each country (see figure 1). Between September 2014 and May 2015 online 
and paper based surveys were sent out by ombudsmen staff to consumers who had been through their 
complaints procedures. This approach had several advantages. The ombudsmen staff sent out the 
surveys, reflecting the amount and type of cases completed, by month. This allowed me to respect the 
anonymity of the consumer and prevent selection bias. In total, 1,465 participated in the German sample 
and 1,310 participated in the UK sample. The average response rate was 22%. 
The survey contained both closed and open-ended questions. Closed questions were focused on 
perceptions of procedural justice and the legitimacy of the ombudsmen and (only) provided the 
demographic data in this paper. The quantitative datasets have been used to produce individual 
ombudsman reports3 and an article that discusses procedural justice and decision-acceptance of recent 
users of ombudsmen (Creutzfeldt and Bradford forthcoming). Open-ended questions asked about 
people’s expectations of the ombudsmen, and reasons for contacting them. This set of questions informs 
the qualitative analysis, of 2,775 responses, in this paper. Initially, the open-ended question were added 
as an experiment to see if people would choose to take time to elaborate on their experiences, as well as 
ticking boxes for the quantitative series of questions. The unexpected richness of the responses enabled 
me to explore, distinguish, and compare respondents’ attitudes towards ombudsmen. The responses 
reflected people’s complex attitudes to justice.
Ombudsmen and ADR bodies come in many different shapes and sizes, have different 
procedures, and deal with different types of complaints. Generally in an ombudsman procedure the 
citizen does not have legal representation.4 According to shared rules throughout the EU about when 
people can contact an ombudsman, all citizens will have already had to deal with either a company 
(private sector) or a local authority (public sector) internal complaints procedure. This means that people 
have spent weeks or months trying to sort out their complaint before they qualify to approach an 
ombudsman.
3.1 Public sector ombudsmen: types of complaints 
Public sector ombudsmen look at grievances citizens have about public bodies. They have different 
jurisdictions and, within these, are responsible for various types of citizens’ complaints.  This study 
2




 This varies across countries and ombudsmen: for example, in Germany it is quite common to have a lawyer involved for 
insurance and energy complaints. Whereas, in the UK it is rare to have a lawyer involved.
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concerns three public sector ombudsmen: the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO)5 and the 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO)6 in the UK; and the Petitionsausschuss7 
[committee on petitions] in Germany. 
 The LGO, created by the Local Government Act in 1974, processes complaints about local 
councils and some other authorities and organizations, including education admissions appeal panels and 
adult social care providers (such as care homes and home care providers). It is a free service for the 
citizen. The LGO’s job is to investigate complaints in a fair and independent way, without taking sides.8 
It considered 11,725 complaints and enquiries in 2013−14, of which 6,880 cases were investigated. 
The role of the PHSO is to investigate complaints from individuals who consider they have been 
treated unfairly or have received poor service from government departments and other public 
organizations and the NHS in England. The PHSO received 27,566 enquiries in 2013−14 and assessed 
7,760 complaints (6,093 about the NHS and 1,658 about a government organization) and completed 
2,199 investigations. 
The Petitionsausschuss in Germany, also called the ‘Parliament’s seismograph’ on its website, 9 
has a mandate to examine the impact of legislation on ordinary people (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015). 
Any letters with requests or complaints addressed to the Bundestag [the lower house of the German 
parliament] are passed on to the Committee, which examines and deliberates on these petitions. This 
makes it a ‘seismograph’, which records the mood among the population, on the basis that citizens are 
best placed to say whether legislation is achieving its intended aims or causing new problems and 
therefore needs to be reviewed critically, or whether the Bundestag should take action to address a 
particular concern. In 2015 there were 15,325 petitions filed by individuals (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2015).
3.2 Private sector ombudsmen: types of complaints
Compared to public sector ombudsmen, most private sector ombudsmen are still fairly recent institutions 
(Hodges et al 2012). Private sector ombudsmen look at grievances consumers have with businesses 
about faulty goods and services. They are set up in different ways to their public sector counterparts and 
cover different sectors and areas of complaints. Figure 1 provides an overview of the ombudsmen 
examined in this study. The following provides a brief overview of the Financial Ombudsman Service 
(FOS) and Ombudsman Services (OS) in the UK and the söp (Schlichtungsstelle für den öffentlichen 
Personenverkehr) 10 in Germany. All of these services are free of charge to the consumer. The different 
models have different funding structures, but for the most part participating companies bear the cost of 
the procedures, either with a set fee-structure or on a ‘polluter pays’ basis. As I have explained 
elsewhere, for example ‘OS is funded by industry on a “polluter pays” basis, through a combination of 
subscription and case fees. Case fees are the charge to consider a complaint, which is not dependent on 
outcome. This acts as an incentive for companies that is, by improving their customer service and 
resolving more complaints in-house they stand to minimize disputes referred to OS and thus pay less 






 Germany has no public sector ombudsman as such; the German equivalent is the Petitionsausschuss. It has similar functions 
as the UK public sector ombudsmen discussed in this paper, but with a comparatively limited mandate. 
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 Conciliation body for public transport https://soep-online.de/ 
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The FOS11 was set up under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to resolve individual 
disputes between consumers and financial businesses. The types of complaints covered are PPI 
(payment protection insurance), banking, insurance, mortgages, credit cards and store cards, loans and 
credit, payday lending and debt collecting, pensions, savings and investments, hire purchase and 
pawnbroking, money transfer, financial advice, and stocks, shares, unit trusts and bonds. In 2013−14 
there were 2,357,374 initial enquiries and complaints from consumers, and around one in five 
progressed into a formal dispute.
Ombudsman Services12 is an institution that provides dispute resolution for the communications, 
energy, property, and copyright licensing industries. Across all industry sectors Ombudsman Services 
received 173,664 initial contacts in 2013−14, and resolved 28,640 cases. More specifically, taking the 
Energy sector as an example, 26,760 energy complaints were handled in 2013−14.  The types of 
complaints were mainly billing (82%), transfers to other providers (13%) and sales (3%).
The söp was founded in December 2009 and deals with complaints about travel by train, bus, 
aeroplane, and ship. In 2013 the söp completed 3.576 cases. For the present study, only airline disputes 
are considered, which were dealt with online (Creutzfeldt and Berlin 2016). These are mainly about 
delays, cancellation, and baggage. In 2014 söp dealt with 4,813 airline complaints.
[Figure 1: ADR bodies in the study about here]
This overview of the types and number of complaints public and private ombudsmen deal with in 
different sectors highlights the diversity in the landscape of dispute resolution in the informal justice 
system (Hodges et al  2012; Berlin 2014).
3.3 The nature of the sample
The limitations of this approach have to be kept in mind when discussing the results. They are twofold, 
firstly as regards to the sample and secondly as regards to the choice of comparison between public and 
private sector. 
The sample consists of a specific group of ombudsman users: those who had been through the 
complaints procedure and chose to be part of the study. There is the possibility that people who are upset 
with the process are more likely to respond to a survey than people who are satisfied. Further, public and 
private ombudsmen look at very different types of complaints. My study compared people’s experiences 
with the overall management of their complaint; it did not explore the detail of individual complaints. 
There is a difference in the contractual relationship between a customer and a supplier of goods and 
services and the more complex relationship between the citizen and the state. This study looks at general 
attitudes and detects patterns in complainants’ expectations; it is not an in-depth case-by-case analysis.
However, as this is the first study of its kind with a unique dataset on public and private 
ombudsman users, across countries, the data provides a starting point from which to understand people’s 
expectation of the ombudsman system. In other words, this paper is setting the scene by exploring the 






Nonetheless, the paper does identify certain national differences, between German and UK ombudsman 
users.
IV.  RECENT USERS OF OMBUDSMEN
Demographics 
Although the responses of the users of ombudsmen in this study vary, clear patterns can be identified. 
The majority of respondents of the survey sample of 2,775 in Germany and the UK are (on average): 
male (60%), between 35 and 55 years old (75%), educated (55,3%) and (in the UK) white (77,4%). 
These findings resonate with Hertogh’s results in his paper on public sector ombudsmen and trust in the 
Netherlands: ‘although the ombudsman aims to reach all types of citizens, most complainants are highly 
educated, white-collared, politically interested men’ (Hertogh 2013). One contribution of the dataset in 
this study is that it is evident that public and private sector ombudsmen in Germany and the UK largely 
share the same demographic profile. However, a few nuances were detected. Looking at the overall 
figures of this sample, people who go to a private sector ombudsman are more likely to be employed and 
have a higher level of education than those who approach a public sector ombudsman. The user age 
varies slightly according to type of scheme. Generally speaking, the public sector has a larger number of 
older users and a slightly wider-spread ethnic demographic than the private sector. Data on ethnicity 
could only be gathered in the UK. In Germany questions about ethnicity are not permitted. I conclude 
from the sample that the public sector ombudsmen as reaching a wider demographic than the private 
sector ones. 
4.1 Shared narratives and role expectations of ombudsmen
To explore patterns of attitudes to the ombudsmen empirically in the datasets, I initially read through the 
open-ended questions in two sets of data: the PHSO (public sector) and the FOS (private sector). The 
survey questions were: ‘Could you briefly state, in your own words, what the problem was you 
contacted the ombudsman about?’ and ‘what did you expect the ombudsman to do for you?’ In search of 
narratives within the answers, my own questions were: (a) what do people expect an ombudsman to do 
for them, (b) in people’s expectations of an ombudsman, what role does the law play, if any, and  (c) 
what do respondents say about justice, more generally?  
The narratives in the open-ended questions indicate differences between expectations of public 
and private ombudsmen. People approaching a public sector ombudsman are mainly interested in the 
public body’s accountability and need the ombudsman to remind the public body of this. In the private 
sector, consumers seek ‘a quick fix’ from the ombudsman to their problem, which is typically financial 
compensation. The expectations of an ombudsman, however, are very similar in both sectors and across 
countries. In the following sections I showcase the data that led to both findings, first the different 
expectations of public and private sector ombudsmen, and second the shared narratives across public 
and private, and national divide.
4.1.1 Public sector ombudsman: seeking accountability 
Expectations of people who approach the public sector ombudsman are, in line with the aim of this type 
of institution, to ensure public accountability for services that are not being provided as they are 
supposed to. Here, the difference in mandate and procedures between the British ombudsmen (PHSO 
and LGO) and the German Petitionsausschuss does not allow for a detailed analysis of differences or 
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similarities beyond public accountability. However, the answers to the question ‘What did you expect the 
ombudsman to do for you?’ are presented below.
Typical expectations of people approaching the Petitionsausschuss13 related to public 
acknowledgement of problems, issues of human rights and corruption. A typical example from this 
small dataset (25 respondents was made up of 15 males and 10 females) was the following:
I had hoped for my complaint to turn into a public debate and that it would grab the attention of 
the lawmakers. I hoped for a change in laws and help for me and for fellow citizens who have 
suffered the same problem but lack the courage to act.  […] to get a clear stand that corruption 
and fraud are not legal in Germany.
The LGO and PHSO respondents shared expectations of accountability, that the ombudsman process 
would set things right not only for them but also for others, to raise matters of public interest, and get an 
apology. Some examples from the LGO dataset (314 respondents: 58,9% male; 40,5% females, 81,6% 
white British), and the PHSO dataset (265 respondents: 54,8% male; 45,2% female, 77,3% white 
British) were as follows:
I expected the ombudsmen to address the issues with the planning department; make them 
accountable for their mistakes so that the same problems didn't arise again; […] insist that 
questions were answered and not just ignored. 
I expected the ombudsman to conduct a thorough investigation into my concerns so that lessons 
could be learned […] take my evidence and that of the Council to evaluate whether 
maladministration had occurred.
Summing up, public sector ombudsmen are expected to improve the way things are done for both the 
citizen, and also for others; to get the authority to apologize; to flag a problem of general interest that 
should be in the public debate; and, to get the authorities to change their behaviour. 
4.1.2. Private sector ombudsman: seeking individual redress 
By contrast, the data showed that expectations of people who approach the private sector ombudsman 
are more often driven by hopes of fast individual dispute resolution and financial compensation. A 
combination of responses from consumer ombudsmen in Germany and the UK show similar expressions 
of expectations from the respective ombudsmen.  
Some examples of the German dataset underline the expectations of fast, cheap, and easy 
individual redress. Respondents expect:
...that he [the ombudsman] should put things right and help me enforce my rights, at no cost to 
me and in a fast and efficient manner.
…that he [the ombudsman] solves the problem with the insurance, and convinces them that I 
have the law on my side.
Similarly, the UK respondents expect the ombudsman to:
13
 I translated the German data into English.
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…force [the company] to make the payments owed promptly, with a small compensation 
amount.
… act on my [the consumer's] behalf, hopefully with some 'teeth' or power behind them, to force 
[the company] to finally do what any self-respecting company trading within the UK should do, 
i.e. treat its customers with some level of service & respect.
Private sector ombudsmen are expected to get consumers’ money back or compensation; to be an 
enforcer for the individual; and to provide fast, positive results. As one of the respondents pointed out:
 In my case I got the impression that the pure fact that I asked the conciliation body for ‘help’ led 
to my “opponent” taking me seriously!! In other words, in this country [Germany] arguments 
only have limited power, it seems more important to have the right “letterhead”, to have a 
“competent” sender.
Despite consumers creating a sector-specific narrative, however, I found distinctions when probing 
further. 
The data shows quite clearly, that despite individuals contacting ombudsmen for different 
purposes, both German and UK respondents have common role models in mind that they expect the 
ombudsmen to fulfil. In other words, the data exposed demands for ombudsmen to take on different 
roles as the middleman between a ‘small’ individual and a ‘large’ company or institution. In both private 
and public settings, there was a desire to be heard and treated fairly14, and to have a competent partner to 
sort out the problem, the narratives indicate four distinct roles that an ombudsman is expected to 
perform during the individual’s complaints journey.
4.2 The roles (expected) of ombudsmen 
The narratives within the dataset that uncovered people’s expectations of an ombudsman translated into 
four normative roles (see table 1). These roles became apparent in the dataset, creating a pattern of how 
people think and talk about the ombudsmen.
[Table 1: normative roles people expect of ombudsmen about here]
These four roles are not absolutely separate from one another. As with most studies trying to make sense 
of everyday human interactions, there are no clear boundaries. This means that the role-expectations 
may overlap throughout an individual’s complaint journey.  What is common to these roles is that they 
are expected to even out the power imbalance between the ‘small’ individual and the ‘big’ company or 
council. The four roles are outlined below. 
Ombudsman as interpreter
14
 These findings resonate with the four key criteria of procedural justice: voice, standing, neutrality, and respect (Tyler & 
Lind 1988).
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The complainant needs the ombudsman to break through communication barriers. This role requires the 
ombudsman to translate and advise both ways; firstly to the consumer to clarify what the company 
actually means and, secondly, to find the right words for the consumer to respond to the company. In 
many ways this is a basic information, signposting and communication service.  Some responses from 
the dataset explain this role. 
 I expected the ombudsman to contact [the company] and find out just what had happened ... as I 
was being fed rubbish by them!! I need help to understand my rights and their enforcement 
and that my concerns are heard and taken seriously.
 I wanted to get the government department to reply to my complaint letter, I hoped they could 
get both companies to actually listen and properly investigate what was causing the delays 
so someone could take responsibility and finally sort it out, rather than just expecting me to 
pay money that I didn't actually owe at all. Neither company would listen to me and just kept 
telling me it was the other company's fault.
 I hoped that my problem would be brought to the attention of [the company] more forcefully 
than I was able to do. I felt as if I was just a number in the scheme of things and I should wait to 
be told at their convenience. I hoped they could provide an answer and a time scale to bring this 
to an end.
I expected an independent view of my complaint and advice of the avenues available to me to 
pursue it further.
I have been on hold with [the company] for 40 minutes on many occasions and in the end I 
realised that I haven't got time for it to go any longer. All I was hoping for the Ombudsman to do 
was to tell them to close my account – [the company] has ignored all of my emails and messages 
on Facebook so I had no other means of contacting them. [The company] owed me £270.
Ombudsman as advocate 
The complainant needs the ombudsman to help reach his or her goal and is happy to hand over the case. 
The role as a supporter is asking the ombudsman to fulfil a task of providing a voice for the consumer, 
to be a consumer advocate. The consumer is expecting the ombudsman to support him/her in the 
complaints procedure. 
I expected the ombudsman to consider the evidence presented by myself and others to show that 
the authority failed in its duty. I wanted them to fairly compare this evidence with that presented 
by the authority. Then, to explain to me to what extent this evidence supported or failed to 
support my complaint and to give a reasoned view of the validity and strength of the complaint. 
[in other words]…I hoped they would give me guidance and advice, I'd hope that the 
ombudsman would pick-up the baton from me and run with it.
I expected the ombudsman to take an impartial view and assess whether the procedures had been 
properly followed. I also hoped that the Council would have been ordered to be more transparent 
in their dealing with the public.
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I needed help to force [the company] to do something rather than totally ignore our complaints 
for many months, [we want the ombudsman] get justice and get an apology for us, to intervene 
and apply common sense and put things right.
I don't know really what to expect. Tell them off? Make them not do it again? I felt the
company were so uninterested in my complaint that most people (especially vulnerable people 
or those with English as a second language) would never have got any sort of resolution. I hoped 
[the] Ombudsman would make them see the error of their ways.
Ombudsman as ally
In this role, the ombudsman is expected to be a professional and competent partner who stands by the 
complainant’s side. The complainant needs backup, support, and reassurance. 
We expected the ombudsman to be independent and listen to our complaint. I felt [the local 
authority] was complacent and arrogant and not really listening to what we were saying, [and 
we wanted the ombudsman to] agree with us that we had a solid case.
 I was looking for someone just to listen to the problems I was experiencing with the company 
and to possibly provide me with some advice as to what I could do further to help me 
communicate with [the company] in order for them to resolve the problem.
I expected that the problem is solved in a manner that non-lawyers can understand it, rather than 
using stereotypical legal (manipulated) reasons to solve the problem. Ordinary citizens cannot 
understand the legal “traps” and if the ADR body is just looking for a solution, guided by these 
legal traps then the consumer has zero chance.
I expected the ombudsman to recognise that the "remedy" offered by the council was 
unacceptable to me and instruct the council to offer a better solution, which would not have 
affected the council in any way, but simply not allowed them to bully me.
The ombudsman should investigate the complaint thoroughly and provide my family with the 
opportunity to put forward our concerns. 
This role has overlaps with the interpreter/advocate roles; however, in some cases a distinct sense of 
needing an ally who is not a lawyer is apparent. This is explored further later in the paper.
Ombudsman as instrument 
The complainant is aware of the ombudsman’s powers and seeks to use them to his or her benefit. The 
individual expects to use the ombudsman as a tool, to open doors and reach an outcome for him or her. 
Some examples illustrate this role. 
I expected the Ombudsman to get [the company] to comply with the agreement I signed up to. I 
expected the Ombudsman to force [the company] to pay back the money owed to me and be able 
to bring [the company] to book to get a move on to sort out their mess quickly and get them to 
sort the problem asap like a general override to help the customer.
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I thought the ombudsman would be able to access parts of the organization, which ordinary 
customers cannot reach and bring the energy supplier to justice and get the problem sorted out to 
my satisfaction.
I expected the ombudsman to assist me in obtaining my case files regarding events fabricated by 
the inspector and to also hold the council accountable for the complete lack of service provided 
in addition to their extremely rude behaviour.
I expected them to get the Council to change their policy so that other people didn't fall foul of it. 
Also so that the Council would in future be taken seriously by local developers, builders and 
architects who currently lie in the application and development process knowing they can do so 
with impunity. I also hoped in the beginning that the Council would insist on my neighbours 
restoring the planting they had destroyed.
The ombudsman should step in promptly to stop this abuse of power and disregard for the 
accepted procedures by the district. 
These four roles can help make sense of the general and varied expectations respondents have of the 
ombudsman in the informal justice system. 
4.3 Assumptions about ombudsmen 
Respondents tend to expect ombudsmen to fulfil at least one of four described roles. The data shows that 
respondents can alternate between the four role expectations throughout a complaint journey. Does this 
mean that people change their expectations alongside their experience of going through the 
ombudsmen’s complaints process?
Initially, I approached the data with a method applied in the study of legal consciousness, asking 
questions about experiences, understandings and clusters of meanings (Ewick & Silbey 1998). The 
methodological approach worked well in the ombudsman context, although it is a different setting to the 
usual considerations of legal consciousness. The four models identified form part of expectations of an 
informal justice model. Unlike legal settings examined through the lens of legal consciousness, the ADR 
context does not have the equivalent foundation in the formal legal system. Prominent scholars of legal 
consciousness describe it as ‘the ways law is experienced and understood by ordinary citizens’ (Merry 
1985). Ewick and Silbey explain the concept of legal consciousness in terms of people’s experience of 
legality: ‘In order to discover the presence and consequence of law in social relations, we must 
understand how legality is experienced and understood by ordinary people as they engage, avoid, or 
resist the law and legal meanings.’ (Ewick & Silbey 1998: 35). In the ombudsman context, we need to 
take a step back and examine how this informal justice system, and how justice in general, are 
experienced and understood.
People seem to have expectations of justice of an ombudsman and therefore expect them to act in 
a certain way. This could be based on people’s legal socialization (Trinkner & Cohn, 2014) and 
encounters with the formal legal system.  The ombudsman, especially in the private sector, is not well 
known in justice systems of EU member states (Hodges et al 2012). Therefore, we might anticipate that 
peoples’ expectations are based on their existing expectations of the legal realm. This might explain the 
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observed shift in expectations and its effect on perceptions of ombudsmen, as seen in my data. Four 
cases exemplify the shift in expectations during a complaint journey. 
Case 1 reported a complaint about a local council. 
The service was good but I felt that I was not kept informed about what was happening and had 
to wait for a response. The case handlers’ reasoning needed to be better explained and 
supported, the outcome seemed decided from the first response. A small sum of compensation 
was paid - not one that I agreed with but one, which the Ombudsman felt, was appropriate 
and I didn't. Having never been in this situation before I didn’t know what to expect! The 
ombudsman either failed to understand the complaint, or, in my opinion was biased towards 
the xxx council.
Case 2 complained about an energy company. The expectations of the ombudsman were to investigate 
honestly and thoroughly. 
The staff was unhelpful and did not understand my problem. I was dissatisfied because it [the 
process] was far from impartial, failed to answer pertinent questions and preferred conjecture to 
facts, the final decision was full of factual errors, which no effort was made to correct. I felt the 
service is not fit for purpose and is far from impartial; I was not being listened to. 
Case 3 an energy complaint that was ongoing. The respondent expected the ombudsmen to resolve the 
problem and to attempt to ensure that [the company’s] procedure was spotlighted to prevent them 
behaving like this with other customers. 
I am fairly satisfied with the ombudsman. [The company] left a vulnerable disabled customer 
with a bill for nearly £1,800. The best the ombudsman could come up with was for them to offer 
a written apology and for me to repay the debt according to my means. [The company]  have 
issued the apology and it is an outrage and an insult. Overall I think the service is fine but it 
seems to me that the perceived protectors of the public good are either unwilling or unable to 
take appropriate action against the big six. I had hoped that the ombudsman would find in my 
favour but in my heart I was of the opinion that they where powerless and unwilling which was 
the outcome in the end. It is a hollow process with no teeth from my experience. I think people 
look to it with hope but the ombudsman appears to do nothing to tackle the behaviour and 
procedure of the companies.
Case 4 is a PPI mis-selling claim. The respondent expected the ombudsman to resolve the issue as 
shown on television programmes. The respondent perceived the staff as unhelpful and was fairly 
dissatisfied. 
I started the process feeling satisfied as it went in my favour, this then changed to against me, 
then finally in my favour. Although the outcome was in my favour at the end, initially it was not 
until I asked many questions that were not answered and the ombudsman found in my favour.
These examples show that people, who go through an ombudsman process, can change their perceptions 
throughout their complaint journey. As people are unsure of what to expect, their expectations are 
closely entwined with the outcome they receive.15 
15
 The question of procedural justice is dealt with in another paper (Creutzfeldt & Bradford, 2016 forthcoming).
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Summing up, the data has shown that there are no clear expectations people have of an 
ombudsman procedure. Rather, I propose that expectations can be grouped into roles; these may be 
based on users’ experiences and expectations of the (formal) legal system they are accustomed to. 
However, these roles have no clear boundaries and can shift and change throughout a complaint on 
people’s expectations are tested against their experience. The data demonstrates clearly that people are 
still very unsure about what to expect from this ADR model. 
V. Comparing people’s expectations of the ombudsman
The four role expectations of ombudsmen identified above are found throughout the dataset, whether 
relating to public or private ombudsmen, and whether in Germany or the UK. There are, however, 
national distinctions in the ways in which the roles are described, especially the roles of instrument and 
ally. In this section I explore these differences. The roles of advocate and interpreter are described in 
similar terms throughout the dataset. In other words, respondents are looking for support in 
communicating with, and understanding why, the company or local authority is not cooperating. The 
roles of ally and instrument, however, differ between the UK and Germany. I argue that this might be 
related to national characteristics that have been described as general legal culture and institutional 
availability.
Legal culture is a very complex concept (Sewell 2005; Nelken 1996; Nelken 2010; Silbey 2010) 
and is understood here as a ‘system of symbols and meanings and their associated social practices’, as 
they relate to the law (Silbey: 471). In this paper, then, rather than taking the ‘law first’ approach (Sarat 
and Kearns 1993: 55), an exploration of legal culture (Sarat 1977) is more suitable, as an initial step, to 
place expectations of the ombudsman model into context. This allows for exploring, and linking, the 
‘richness and complexity of the interactions of the legal and the everyday’ (Sarat and Kearns 1993:55). 
In other words, it can be seen as a foundation that informs people’s expectations of both the formal and 
informal justice system. Whereas people usually have a clear set of expectations of what the formal legal 
system can provide these are not as clear when it comes to the informal system. National distinctions, 
then, may have implications for the development and acceptance of ADR bodies throughout the EU. 
The implicit assumptions are that external forces of ‘sociocultural production‘ (de Certeau 1984: 
xiv) affect categories of similarly-situated people in similar ways. In the context of this paper I argue 
that people who deal with an ombudsman are influenced through the sociocultural environment of the 
legal culture they are accustomed to. Building on Freidman (1996: 34) definition of legal culture as ‘the 
values and attitudes which bind the system together, and which determined the place of the legal system 
in the culture of the society as a whole.’
In the UK, the expectation that the ombudsmen fulfil the role of ally and instrument, is expressed 
in narratives that are framed less legalistically, less formally. To ‘fully investigate; the common man’s 
last resort; to take over and bring the case to a conclusion; to sort things out for me.’ I suggest that the 
differences Blankenburg (1994) identifies between Germany and the Netherlands might also apply to 
Germany and the UK and this then relates to the way in which expectations are framed. 
In Germany the roles of ally and instrument tend to be framed in very legalistic terms. Terms 
used to describe expectations of the ombudsmen are: ‘legal examination’; ‘legal positioning’; ‘pressure 
through the right letterhead’; to ‘give an official character’; and ‘to judge’. A further example: ‘ I don’t 
want to have to use a lawyer. My experience has shown that a letter of a lawyer moves a lot, this an 
average person cannot accomplish. Unfortunately, this is symptomatic of our times, that even when the 
consumer is in the right, you cannot achieve anything without a lawyer.’  These notions seem to reflect 
what has been described as a hierarchical German legal culture, reflected in the institutional 
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infrastructure Blankenburg 1994; Blankenburg 1998). Although Blankenburg was comparing Dutch and 
German legal cultures, he describes the Dutch having an established network of avoidance infrastructure 
(ADR), which applies to the UK too. ‘German legal culture offers less of an avoidance infrastructure 
than that of the Netherlands. Avoidance is part of the art of attorneys in Germany as well as in the 
Netherlands, but Dutch legal culture offers more alternatives and more pre court conflict institutions 
than German legal culture does’ (ibid p.20). Blankenburg focuses on institutional infrastructure 
(availability) as representing a key difference in legal culture. The institutional differences he identified 
are reflected in Germany and the UK, studied in this paper.
The institutional set-up, or availability of ADR bodies, despite being regulated through EU wide 
standards, is very inconsistent (Hodges et al 2012). Those bodies that do exist have a variety of 
institutional structures and, on closer examination, national specificities. The fact that users of 
ombudsmen in Germany express their expectations in very legalistic and formal ways, might then, 
reflect the set up of ombudsmen in Germany. All German ombudsmen are retired judges and all of their 
decision-making staff are lawyers. It is likely that in this way the system acquires acceptance and 
credibility from the German public. Although decisions are not binding through a (retired) judge issuing 
recommendations, they take on a legal character. In many ways the German ombudsman model 
represents a level of legal formality that is absent in the UK ombudsman schemes. In the UK the set up 
of ombudsmen is very varied. Unlike in Germany, there is no clear profile of a person working as an 
ombudsman. There is no need for legal background and degrees. Rather the ombudsmen and their staff 
are trained only in the applicable legal contexts. 
The differences the language used by German and British ombudsmen might reflect on the one 
hand, general differences in national legal cultures, but also differences in the institutional set-up and 
availability of these ADR procedures. These two factors are almost certainly related. 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper has examined distinct narratives of expectations of ombudsmen, as part of the informal 
justice system, in a comparative approach. The comparison emerged from a systematic study, with 
closed questions, intended to be analysed in a quantitative way. However, the study provided 
unexpected richness of data from the open-ended questions. The answers to these questions analysed 
qualitatively, identify common attitudes and expectations. They also reveal interesting national 
differences within a pattern of overall, cross-cultural similarity. 
The qualitative dataset allowed me to explore attitudes to justice among recent users of 
ombudsmen in Germany and the United Kingdom. Building on shared attitudes and commonalities, 
differences in ombudsmen procedures were explored in public and private settings, and across national 
boundaries. The comparison of expectations of recent ombudsmen users highlighted both differences 
and similarities.
The main differences the dataset exposed were that citizens using a public sector ombudsman to 
complain about the accountability of a public body tend to be seeking an apology and hoping for 
systemic change, whereas consumers complaining through a private sector ombudsman are more 
focused on their individual dispute and are seeking a ‘quick fix’. These findings are in line with the 
purpose of the respective bodies.
However, the study uncovered similarities, despite the differences in mandate, jurisdiction, and 
responsibilities of the studied ombudsmen; the expectations of the roles that ombudsmen fill are the 
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same. These findings ring true across sectors and countries in this study. These roles are: interpreter, 
advocate, ally and instrument. Although the roles overlap, this helps to shed light on general attitudes 
and evolving expectations of ombudsmen. On closer inspection there are subtle differences that are 
reflected in the four roles. The main distinction is the use of language; in Germany it is more legalistic in 
comparison to the UK. I argue that this might be related to two factors: what has been described as 
‘general legal culture’ and institutional set-up and availability. The comparison between recent users of 
ombudsmen in different counties has therefore allowed me to identify developing narratives and patterns 
that could form the basis for future research into expectations of the informal justice system. 
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Acronyms UK: Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS); Ombudsman Services: Energy (OS:E); Ombudsman Services: 
Communications (OS:C); Ombudsman Services: Property (OS:P); Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO); 
Local Government Ombudsman (LGO).
Acronyms Germany: Versicherungsombudsmann (VO) [insurance]; Schlichtungsstelle Telekommunikation (SchlieT) 
[telecoms]; Schlichtungsstelle Energie (SchlieE) [energy]; Schlichtungsstelle für den öffentlichen Personenverkehr (söp) 
[transport].
Table 1: Normative roles people expect of ombudsmen 
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• … to help me understand what it’s all about. INTERPRETER
• ... to hand over my problem.ADVOCATE
• … to share the responsibility.  ALLY
• … they have the right tools to help me.INSTRUMENT
